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If revolutions are the “sex of history” – being 
“moments of great intensity during which eve-
rything seems transformed” – then “the ten 
years since the fall of Soviet Communism have 
been the sex of historiography”. This view was 
expressed in a 2001 editorial in Kritika, a newly 
established American journal bearing a Russian 
name with ancient Greek roots.1
Indeed, Perestroika in the second half of the 
1980s, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the East-
ern bloc caused a seismic tremor that shook 
not only the Soviet-controlled region but also 
the entire planet. The new international situa-
tion that emerged could not leave historians and 
historiography unaffected insofar as the latter is 
associated with the present and with its reflec-
tion in the work of historians. 
The promising archival revolution during Per-
estroika, namely the easy access to valuable 
but previously largely unknown Soviet archives 
in the metropolitan cities of St Petersburg and 
Moscow and also in the provincial centres, ben-
efitted the field of Russian studies, which hith-
erto had not been particularly theoretical in its 
approach. Moreover, from the 1990s onwards, 
Russian studies were infused with the various 
new theoretical approaches developed in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century in the wid-
er humanistic and social sciences, such as so-
cial and cultural anthropology, the linguistic turn, 
cultural studies and postcolonial studies – all of 
which transformed historiography into a more 
theoretical terrain. The embracing of new meth-
ods and perspectives inevitably led to new fields 
of research. In addition to the above, the 1990s 
experienced a creative osmosis and refamiliari-
sation of Russophone historiography and that in 
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other languages through the translation not only of texts but also of perceptions, concepts, ideas 
and theories. Various exchanges and research programmes were institutionalised, and as a result 
Russian historiography has been in a process of internationalisation, best manifested in the intense 
and frequent communication between scientists originating from different parts of the world, for 
example the former Soviet Union, Europe, North America and Japan. Among the side effects of 
this worldwide communication are the interaction between different scientific communities, the 
osmosis of national frameworks and the creation of a multiplicity of international networks of ex-
change. This open communication and exchange of both data and theories has given rise to a fer-
tile dialogue and created a friendly environment for common endeavours between peers in order 
to organise and categorise knowledge.2 
The new meanings that emerged with regard to the relations between present and past had a defi-
nite influence on the research agendas of Russianists and this has led to a reinterpretation of Rus-
sian history away from cold war certainties and ossifications, represented in the west by bipolar 
geopolitical simplifications with Orientalist overtones and in the world of so-called “existing social-
ism” a wooden language tailored to the only existing theoretical paradigm (Marxism à la Russe/
Soviet Marxism), replete with deliberate silences and “white holes”. Thus from the 1990s onwards, 
traditional schemes in the study of Russian history have become more sophisticated by way of new 
approaches or innovative criticism, and as a result have been put in doubt or abandoned.3 
In the post-Soviet space, the concept of class that had been the dominant analytical tool and organ-
ising principle for historical narration during the Soviet era was abandoned for the sake of a new 
conceptual apparatus that prioritised two analytical categories in particular; nation and empire. In 
the course of the 1990s, the main focus of researchers was on the notion of the nation, whereas in 
the following decade it concentrated on a renewed interest in the notion of empire, in what has been 
termed the “imperial turn”. As Ronald Grigor Suny has put it, “empire studies became a flourishing 
interdisciplinary sub-discipline”, with imperialistic ambitions regarding the fields it tried to cover.4 
The aim of my contribution is neither to cover exhaustively what is a rich and multifaceted histo-
riographical output arising from different scientific environments (Russian, Anglo-Saxon, French, 
German, Italian, Norwegian, Japanese, etc.) nor to present fissures or continuities in each tradi-
tion and all the subtle nuances of each particular debate since 1991 (arbitrarily taken as a thresh-
old). Such a task would have been impossible within the limited space afforded by this special is-
sue of Historein, which is devoted to new trends in the theory of history and social sciences during 
the last 20 years. After all, numerous well-written and thorough surveys have been published in 
the two decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union that adequately cover the diverse histo-
riographical tendencies.5 
My aim is more limited; it is to portray the problematic of empire in the Russian case as an alterna-
tive and innovative way of representing the past. This approach, in conjunction with comparative, 
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transnational and global approaches, may challenge the traditional “historiographical nationalism” 
with regard to the nation or the nation-state, which is usually seen not only as the protagonist of 
modernity but also, anachronistically, as the key point of every historical narrative in the longue 
durée, even in historical periods prior to the advent of nationalism and the nation-state. Moreover, I 
will try to show how the “imperial turn” contributed to the process of locating Russian history within 
a broader spectrum and a wider global perspective beyond an established and narrowly defined 
Eurocentric prism that regarded Russia as a special case deviating from the European model of 
development – a perspective which was shared by Marxists as well. 
The lens of empire and nationality studies created the prerequisites for the easier incorporation of 
Soviet history within the wider frame of Russian history. It put aside the teleology of “1917”, which 
is no longer regarded as a watershed.6 Furthermore, even though the Soviet Union was not of-
ficially an empire during its lifetime, it was viewed as such when it collapsed. More specifically, it 
has been examined by most researchers as the last episode of the historical transcendence from 
empire to nation in the twentieth century. Ironically, the present-day Russian Federation – one of 
the successor states to the Soviet Union, is often described by commentators, not least as a result 
of Vladimir Putin’s grandiose rhetoric, as a state with imperial ambitions.7 Nevertheless, there is 
still no general consensus as to whether the Soviet state was – or was not – an empire, to what 
extent the “postsocialist” or “post-Soviet” condition can be viewed from the postcolonial paradigm 
and, finally, under what conditions this problematic can be applied to the present-day Russian Fed-
eration. Can it be placed within the postcolonial paradigm as a “Self” or as an “Other” or, simultane-
ously, both?8 In the present article, I will limit myself to the period of Russian history during which 
the Russian state was self-defined as an empire, from the eighteenth century to 1917. 
I will base my presentation on the material supplied by two scholarly journals that came to the fore 
during the same period, i.e. the beginning of this millennium. These journals can be regarded as the 
offspring of the tremendous transformations felt in Russian studies during the initial post-Soviet 
decade. Both journals have significantly contributed to the theorisation of the field of Russian stud-
ies.9 Despite the fact that they represent two diverse local conditions of scientific output, they are 
both transnational in their approach, and, as a result of constant exchanges, have both contributed 
to the creation of a “polyphonic” research community with regard to its views and methodology, 
sharing common research topics and questions and systematically cultivating the imperial turn in 
the study of Russian history.
The first of the two journals – Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History – is pub-
lished in the United States and is currently based at Georgetown University’s school of foreign 
service. From 2000 to August 2011 Kritika was associated with the history department of the 
University of Maryland. From the beginning, its editors – Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist and 
Marshall Poe – adopted the term Eurasia, which is associated with the wider structural changes 
in the world and the politics of US academia in delineating the field.10 At first glance, the spatial 
terminology seems apt, even though it is not devoid of negative connotations, as it is also true 
in the case of the term empire. The editors appear to have been fully aware of the pitfalls of this 
term; nevertheless, they remained steadfast in the view that the adopted term was aligned with 
the research priorities and the agenda of the new journal, i.e. to address “comparative, trans-
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national, cross-cultural, local and regional histories alongside those written within national and 
state-centred frameworks”.11 Today, the new subfield of Eurasian studies is generally accepted 
as covering the area of the former Soviet Union as well as those regions historically neighbour-
ing the Russian imperial state. It also implies research interests covering the periphery and the 
borderlands apart from the imperial centre.12 
The second journal I have singled out is multilingual (but mostly written in Russian and English) 
and has the characteristic title of Ab Imperio: Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in 
the Post-Soviet Space. I will give greater emphasis to this journal because it focuses on empire per 
se and is an unusual academic project for Russia. It is based not in the capital cities, but in Kazan, 
the capital of Tatarstan. It is interdisciplinary and works in close collaboration with local as well 
as foreign scholars. In the Russian nationalist media, Ab Imperio is openly accused of being en-
gaged in “antipatriotic” activity because it uses foreign grants. Its editorial team is comprised of Ilya 
Gerasimov, Serguei Glebov, Alexander Kaplunovski, Marina Mogilner and Alexander Semyonov. 
With their research and their insightful editorials, they have succeeded in elevating this journal to 
the forefront of the debates with regard to the conceptualisation of this field of research. They have 
adopted the term “new imperial history”, which is in line with poststructural approaches and the 
linguistic and cultural turn, and they have put an emphasis on the principal differentiation between 
the categories of analysis and the categories of practice. Their approach differs from “old imperial 
history”, with its emphasis on central authority and the point of view emanating from the capitals, 
and they have redirected their interest towards multiple vantage points coming from the periph-
ery as well as the subaltern.13 Moreover, the journal is in conversation with the British imperial 
turn and its similar new imperial history.14 The themes examined in the issues of this journal have 
contributed to a better understanding of the interrelated phenomena of empire and nation within 
the Russian context, by focusing on different viewpoints such as the concepts of modernisation, 
memory, frontier, knowledge output, languages of self description, the second world and so on. It 
appears committed to the internationalisation of innovative research and contributes to the circu-
lation of knowledge. It functions as a forum, a “virtual workshop and moderation for discussion”,15 
for western historians and those who reside in the new states of the post-Soviet region. The jour-
nal has covered all the relevant international debates, wherein one may observe a fruitful dialogue 
between Russian and western researchers. 
Finally, this specific journal, apart from contributing to the circulation and promotion of knowledge, 
seriously challenges the stereotypical division of scholarly labour, i.e., where the westerners pro-
duce theory while the easterners produce empirical studies. As a result, all its contributors partake 
in international scholarly dialogue as equals and not as subalterns.16 
From nation to empire
Although the Russian state was self-defined as an empire, from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century to 1917, during the Cold War, with few exceptions – as in the cases of Richard Pipes, Hugh 
Seton-Watson and Seymour Becker – studies of empire, nationalism and nation/ethnicity were 
not the backbone of studies of the Russian Empire.17 The situation changed drastically during the 
1990s, when the phenomenon of nationalism drew international attention. 
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On the one hand, the post-Soviet space is replete with new national narratives fashioned by the 
new national states engaged in a primordial discourse, which is also typical of Soviet approaches 
to the phenomenon of nationalism.18 These new narratives attempt to present the various new na-
tions as autonomous objects and subjects of history. This tendency coincides with the attempt to 
put an emphasis on the break with Russian/Soviet domination, the democratisation of history and 
an alternative historical narration originating from below and from what was previously perceived 
as the periphery. On the other hand, during the same period and on the other side of Europe, as 
well as in America, the theories of nationalism do not count the primordialist line of reasoning as 
a scholarly approach, but simply as national history. They even proceed beyond the modernist or 
ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism towards critical and postmodern approaches of national-
ism. In particular, a national narrative that tends to be perennial or primordial is viewed by defini-
tion as a self-serving narrative of violence, exclusion and silencing. The reconceptualisation of the 
phenomenon of nationalism has been enriched by the study of gender, the construction of identity, 
postcolonial studies, the work of Homi Bhabha and others along the same vein, as well as stud-
ies of immigration, diasporas, the phenomenon of deportation and the study of ethnic and other 
oppressed minorities within nation-states. Critical studies regard nationalism as a modern phe-
nomenon, as in the case of modernist theories of nationalism. Yet, they differ from the modernist 
paradigm in that they do not regard the situation as fixed in time and space but open ended; therein 
the nation is fluid, is constructed and reconstructed, is questioned, and reappears.19 These theories 
have posed powerful challenges to the traditional historiographical paradigm: in them, the nation 
has been denaturalised while the nation-building process that led to the construction of the nation 
was put under scrutiny only to be proved that it did not necessarily lead to the creation of the na-
tion. At the antipodes of primordialist national narratives in the service of national projects, a new 
research situation emerged among Russianists characterised by rich and pluralistic methods and 
interpretations as well as a critical stance towards ideology and various one-sided interpretations.20
One could claim that the imperial turn and new imperial history are closely connected to the proc-
ess described above and that it surfaced partly as a result of the new findings from the study of the 
national phenomenon, though the opposite may also be asserted, i.e. that the imperial dimension 
contributed profoundly to a better understanding of the complex and constructed nature of iden-
tities. This was even more so the case following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This histori-
cal event has led to the examination of a different historical pattern for the empires of central Eu-
rope and Eurasia, a pattern that distinguished itself from the traditional Manichean polarities – the 
dynastic (East) versus the bourgeois (West), the archaic versus the modern, etc. This innovative 
pattern may be best described as a continental, adjacent empire with permeable boundaries and 
unclear distinctions between the centre and periphery, accommodating mixed populations and 
common cultural ingredients.21
Nationalism revisited
This shift from the study of domestic and national history towards the study of the empire has been 
marked by the “dialogue” between two seminal works, one by the Swiss historian Andreas Kap-
peler (Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung. Geschichte, Zerfall, Munich: Beck, 1992)22 and the 
other by British historian Geoffrey Hosking (Russian People and Empire, 1552–1917, Cambridge, 
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Harvard UP, 1997). Both authors use the concept of the empire as a political and social context in 
order to study the national phenomenon. Kappeler introduced the concept of the Russian Empire’s 
multinational character in order to counterbalance the dominant Russocentric view of Russian 
history. By doing so he decentred and derussified the Russian narrative; he relocated the Russian 
nation from the core of the historical narratives of the Russian Empire and brought forth into the 
historical scene the subaltern peoples, ethnocultural communities and nations. Hosking created 
new terms for the study of Russian nationalism by using the multinational character of the Russian 
Empire. On the contrary to Kappeler, he placed the Russian nation at the centre and highlighted its 
relations to the Russian state and the other peoples or nations of the empire in order to demon-
strate the deviation of the Russian nation from the western norm, i.e. the Russian state did not be-
long to the Russian nation whose name it held, while the integration process of the Russian nation 
remained unfulfilled until the end of the twentieth century.23 In other words, he introduced a para-
digmatic discourse for the interpretation of the Russian national phenomenon: Russian national 
identity remained underdeveloped and suppressed precisely due to the dominance of the imperial 
model of state-building. He, thus, counterbalanced a previous paradigmatic approach according to 
which Russian nationalism was closely associated with the process of nation- and empire-building. 
Within such a framework that recognised the Russian state’s multiethnicity (multinationalism), the 
ambiguity of the relationship between empire and nation became apparent. Particularly in the Rus-
sian case, nationalism was not studied as if it had been the only actor of Russian history. A series 
of questions were addressed. For example, was Russian nationalism a state ideology or not? What 
are the conditions we should take into consideration in order to discuss the politics of russification 
during the modernisation period in the second half of the nineteenth century? Was the concept of 
russification one-dimensional or multifaceted, given the fact that the concept of Russianness was 
neither fixed nor well-defined? Was there a consistent and consolidated policy of russification on 
the part of the central authority and especially with regard to central and coordinated planning and 
implementation, or was this not the case? What was the precise role of the imperial bureaucrats 
(who, note, were not necessarily of Russian ethnic origin and faced different cultural conditions 
from one region to another in the vast Russian state) in the realisation of these policies? One must 
also bear in mind that the policies of the centre were open to variations and adaptable to the aims 
and methods used, as they mainly depended on the idiosyncrasy of different regions and collectivi-
ties which inhabited the Russian Empire.24 
Imperial and national subjectivities
In the light of the above, the traditional research strategy used in the study of the relations be-
tween the metropolis and the imperial peripheries that treated the two parts as bipolar opposites 
has been revised. Complex perspectives were adopted by historians that took into consideration 
more parameters such as, for example, the social or religious criteria in creating a hierarchy be-
tween the different populations of the empire. The status of the country, being recognised as an 
influential European power, and the pride resulting therein, were factors that were also taken into 
consideration. A plethora of policies and practices have been studied under the light of the central 
administration’s authority mechanisms, i.e. tolerance, flexibility, dialogue, conciliation, centralisa-
tion and coercion. What has emerged is a scale of relations that existed between the central hege-
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monic power and the peripheries, and within a spectrum ranging from accommodation, accultura-
tion and cooptation to varieties of resistance or violent uprising. The result has been a re-evaluation 
of the stereotypical view of Russia as the “prison of peoples” and its replacement by a more vari-
able and positive image.25 
A complex web of policies, common ideas, perceptions and practices were crucial in negotiating 
and renegotiating ethnic identities and the position of each people or nation within the empire. The 
formation of national identities – including the attempt to determine Russian identity – within an 
imperial milieu encounters particular difficulties, precisely because the subjects could partake in 
multiple identities, i.e. ethnic, religious, state/imperial, regional, social, class, gender and so on. Un-
der this perspective, the Russian Empire may be treated as a kind of special forum, a region where 
different national projects interacted, clashed or were involved in relations of hegemony or subor-
dination. Finally, the reciprocal effects of nationalist ideologies and movements within the empire 
bring to light the multiplicity of Otherness beyond the metropolitan Other.26
In the same vein of thought, the editorial board of Ab Imperio advocates the shift of research in-
terests from the structural analysis of the empire to the concept of the “heterogeneity of society in 
an ‘imperial situation’” (which may also exist in states that do not fall, strictly speaking, under the 
category of empire, such as the Soviet Union) in order to uncover the imperial palimpsest of social 
identities – local, confessional, estate, ethnic – and not the positivist and teleological perspectives 
that point to a historical determinism, namely that of the emergence of a nation-state, that requires 
the structural and Manichean antithesis between empire and nation. Such a research strategy can 
respect the historical subjectivity of peoples and societies that have been neglected by the tradition-
al historical narrations. The aim is to study the role of the empire “as a context setting category”,27 
so as to examine composite subjectivities in complex societies. By studying the languages used 
by the historical subjects for self-description and -representation, one can discern contradictory 
roles (at least in the first instance), as in the case of being a confessional or social subaltern but at 
the same time a full participant in the imperialist expansion in Central Asia. One can also encoun-
ter paradoxical situations within conventional national narratives, such as, for example, the one of 
the Poles, who can be seen not only fighting for their national liberation but also oppressing and 
assimilating “national’ minorities” in their midst.28 
The challenge to the essentialist ethnonational paradigm and the turn to the imperial paradigm 
underscore the importance of other historical forces in the formation of collective identities, even 
more so in the Russian case where the national element was not the decisive one before the ad-
vent of the nineteenth century and in many instances even later, into the twentieth century.29 As 
an example, the study of the religious parameter is crucial, not only as a structural element in the 
construction of identities but also as a vital means whereby the empire conceptualised, institution-
alised and managed difference.30 
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A spatial turn: from the national state to imperial territory
A history of empire in the place of national history should not, of course, be conceived as the accu-
mulation or sheer addition of national histories. It presupposes the study of transnational and en-
tangled methods of research so as to be able to understand the interaction and interdependence 
of these histories.31 Another avenue in the same general trend is the “spatial turn”, whose fertile 
methodology and approach were “adopted” by the problematic of empire.32 
The nation or the nation-state, as a key unit of scholarly inquiry, transports all the spatial referenc-
es to a system that prioritises the nation unit. On the contrary, the history of territory, as pointed 
out by von Hagen, can be used as a kind of “anti-paradigm”, for it puts on the research agenda the 
comparative, transcultural, transnational, local and regional dimensions. It brings to the surface 
the history of the interconnections between empires, frontiers as well as diasporas.33 The spatial 
dimension on the one hand implies the comparative and interactive histories of peoples, ideas and 
goods, and challenges in multiple forms the homogeneous nation-state with fixed boundaries as 
a primary organising principle of historical research; on the other hand it includes the category of 
nation in a nonanachronistic manner. Even more provocatively, as claimed by Burbang and von 
Hagen in their introduction to the volume Space, People Power, 1700–1930, the “nation state – if we 
take its premise at face value – is a historical rarity, if not an impossibility”, while an “unabashed 
address to empire as a state form allows us to study polities based on difference, not likeness of 
their subjects and to begin an assessment of the limitations and possibilities of particular histori-
cal imperial projects”.34 Hence, territory is seen as the organisational principle of the historical nar-
ration for the understanding of the polity, the ideas regarding history, religion, ethnicity, landscape 
and the mutual relation between the imperial authorities and local societies. 
Contesting the national rule of writing history for the “metropolitan” nation, as well as the subal-
terns, has acquired a special intellectual and political importance in the present-day Russian en-
vironment. The dissolution of the Soviet Union deconstructed the Soviet myth of the friendship of 
peoples. Within the new landscape, former “colonisers” and “colonised” were in a state of conflict 
for territory and political legitimacy, with national history as the prime vehicle. For the editorial 
group of Ab Imperio, the importance of the study of empire also has a moral message or moral 
imperative in the multiethnic Russian Federation, which sees itself as a nation-state, where xen-
ophobia and nationalist or racist tendencies are entrenched in Russian society as well as in the 
societies of the other former Soviet republics. The national perspective in historical writing gives 
birth to narrations with strict borders and results in the exclusion and oppression of all forms of 
heterogeneity in the past and present. In the former Soviet space, the rewriting of history from 
a nationalistic perspective is unable to combine “ours” with “yours” within a historical narration 
that refers to what was, after all, a common past. Τhe object of the exercise is not only to make 
 history-writing richer, more complete and more consonant to the actual experiences οf the peo-
ple who lived in the past and came from different ethnicities and cultures. It is not simply the sen-
sitivity to historical realities but also the sensitivity to the memories and everyday experiences of 
the different groups that inhabit new multiethnic national states. The annual theme of the journal 
in 2007 was “The Imperium of Knowledge and the Power of Silences”, and in the fourth thematic 
issue, entitled “The Future of the Past”, the editors wrote that the “future of the historical past” is 
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explicitly political and pertinent not only to historical realities but also to the language in which his-
torical dynamics are accordingly described and constructed, in order to protect fundamental hu-
man rights and liberties. As they put it: 
And yet, historical writing – and thinking about history – requires exceptional responsibility in 
such historical moments, as ours. One step away from individual rights and freedoms, one 
step towards tacitly approving of the new grand visions of “normal” national states with “cul-
tural cores” and we may find ourselves in accordance with the emerging culture of fascism in 
the early twenty-first century. We have in the present what we managed to recognise as a le-
gitimate history. It is the time to see a different future in our past. We hope that the study of 
empire will help in this venture.35 
Comparative, transnational and entangled histories at interimperial level
A common typology of different empires made a distinction between colonial maritime empires 
with bourgeois characteristics and dynastic empires with archaic, premodern characteristics. On 
the basis of this typology, Russia and the Ottoman and Habsburg empires are predictably placed 
in the second category, precisely because of their premodern elements. Von Hagen, who supports 
the usefulness of the comparison of these three empires, differentiates the comparative criterion: 
the ground for the comparison is that all three have contiguous territory, which is a determining 
factor for the people inhabiting the empires in question, for their nations, intellectual tendencies, 
commerce and so on. The main character of these empires has also been re-examined. As pointed 
out by Ronald Suny,36 the Russian Empire – and we would add the Ottoman and Habsburg empires 
– though not a liberal bourgeois empire, existed in what was a bourgeois European world, and in its 
attempt to cope with the challenges of modernity, thereby adopted a reformist modernising agenda 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. With the concept of multiple modernisations,37 the 
Russian Empire is increasingly treated by researchers not only as merely traditional but also as a 
polity in transformation towards a modern state. As Alexei Miller noted: “The tendency to ‘normal-
ise’ the history of these polities, particularly that of Romanov and Ottoman Empires, and to over-
estimate their success in adapting to modernity is a new extreme in historiography. Only a decade 
ago, there was almost total negation of their ability to adapt and change, now we are witnessing 
the opposite extreme.”38 The comparison has been extended to other empires such as that of the 
German Hohenzollern Empire.39 The creation of the field of Eurasian studies made it possible for 
the comparative framework to move eastwards in space, as well as deeper into the past, with ref-
erence to the Mongolian, Byzantine, Iranian and Chinese empires.40
Dominic Lieven, in his 2001 study The Russian Empire and its Rivals, clearly places his attempt 
within this trend that challenges the national norm of writing history. By defending the utility of 
the comparative method, he places the Russian Empire within a wider global comparative plane, 
“stressing Russia’s place in the shifting European and global constellation of power”.41 Taking into 
consideration the fact that in the nineteenth century, the empire was the ordinary kind of state in 
continental Europe, Eurasia and Asia, he questions, like other authors, the view that the nineteenth 
century was the age of the nation-state.42 Lieven’s aim is to compare the Russian Empire with its 
main contemporary rivals at the time, that is the British, Ottoman and Habsburg empires, bringing 
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into the picture the importance of international relations and of geopolitical challenges within the 
system of great powers as a major factor in the history of empire in Russia. “The demands of inter-
national power politics and of membership the European and then global system of great powers 
were of overwhelming importance in Russian history. More probably than any other single factor 
they determined the history of Modern Russia.”43 
The comparison between continental and overseas empires, dynastic or not, aimed at bringing 
forth similarities and dissimilarities in the mechanisms of the functioning of the empire, in the 
systems of imperial power, the management of multinationalism and the conditions of their dis-
solution. By this comparison, concepts such as “traditional” and “modern” became more complex. 
In examining the Russian Empire not as a political and social context for the nation but as a sub-
ject and agent capable of modernisation in the age of nationalism and with the weight of rivalry 
with the other great powers, Lieven transfers the question from inevitable dissolution to the study 
of the experience and effectiveness of the continental empires in managing multiethnic differenc-
es. The question is not what led the Russian Empire to its collapse but what contributed to its re-
emergence after the 1917 Revolution.44 In examining the Russian Empire in the longue durée and 
the continuities between it and the Soviet Union, there is a tendency to regard the Russian imperial 
experience from the perspective of a “success story”.45 Late imperial Russia is regarded by many 
researchers as a rapidly developing and dynamic economic power in contrast to what is known as 
“declinism” in British historiography referring to the inevitable weakening of the British Empire.46 
The inability of nation-states to resolve successfully the current problems of multinationalism, 
immigration and ethnic conflict underlines the historical experience of empires and their ability to 
maintain stability, with their successes and failures in administrating several distinct ethnic, reli-
gious and cultural populations. 
Challenging comparative history 
However, even though it is relational history, the comparative method is not free of problems, 
such as the asymmetry in the study of distinct and comparable units. Moreover, in the taxon-
omy lurks the danger of creating a hierarchy among empires, especially between modern and 
archaic empires, with the former at the forefront of progress and the latter taking a backward 
direction on the basis of their archaic structures. In the Russian case in particular, the structural 
comparisons are more complicated if we agree with Paul Werth that the Russian imperial state 
was a strange hybrid that simultaneously drew on several models of state organisation: a tradi-
tional dynastic, composite state; an emerging (incomplete) national state and a modern colonial 
empire.47 Or as put by Alexander Semyonov: “The Russian Empire in itself is a locus of intersec-
tions of different imperial traditions.”48 Moreover, as rightly pointed out by the authors of Novaya 
imperskaja istorija [New imperial history], the comparative method solidifies the boundaries of 
the objects of comparison to the detriment of the study of zones of interaction; it faces the com-
mon characteristics of what are the same elements taxonomically as elements of autonomous 
development and not as a product of interaction, common experience and the transfer in time of 
common challenges. The conflict leaves out the cultural dimension and the process of Europe-
anisation, without which one cannot for example understand the practice of cultural appropria-
tion or interpret the imperial ideology.49
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Although strictly speaking not a specialist in Russian history, but a participant in discussions and 
conferences on new imperial history in the Russian context from the point of view of a specialist of 
the French and Dutch empires in the nineteenth century, Ann Stoler wonders “what colonial com-
parisons might look like which are not constrained by nation-bound historiographies, frames and 
narratives”. More concretely, how can we compare “patterns and technologies of rule, political ra-
tionalities and NOT imperial structures, but imperial effects”? And she argues that “there is space 
for a new understanding of comparison, one that emerges from the historically and politically lo-
cated understandings of comparison itself as an imperial project in which architects and agents of 
empire invested themselves”. For example: 
French blueprints for agricultural and pauper colonies drew on strategies of imperial rule that 
were never European alone. French observers looked to Russian initiatives as exemplary ef-
forts to create a reasoned empire through colonisation. As French architects turned to Russia, 
Russian rulers looked to North America, and early colonial America looked to Spanish and Brit-
ish policies in the Caribbean. Such borrowings mark a competitive politics of comparison that 
accelerated circuits of knowledge production and imperial exchange.50 
The challenge to comparative history comes from the turn to the studies of cultural transfers and 
transnational approaches (as distinct from international approaches) for they have the power to 
transcend national categories of analysis,51 in whose family one finds the histoire croisée, intro-
duced by Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann in the 1990s.52 In examining the dynam-
ics as well as the restrictions of the comparative method, Alexei Miller suggests the study of the 
macroregion of continental contiguous empires as a macrosystem from the perspective of entan-
gled histories and the interaction between them. In this perspective, religion comes out yet again 
as a primary focus of research (for example, the Orthodox Christian tsar and his relations with his 
coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire or the corresponding role of the sultan in respect to Muslim 
populations in the Russian Empire). Another primary region of research is the one of multinational 
ideologies (pan-Slavism, pan-Germanism, pan-Turkism), but also of the diasporas (such as the 
Baltic Germans, the Ukrainian nationalists from Russia to Galicia, of Poles and Jews from the Rus-
sian to the German empires, of Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, or of Armenians in the opposite 
direction).53 As macrosystems and as part of global history, Kappeler proposes that we see the 
“peripheral” empires from the point of view of transimperial studies and he underlines the impor-
tance of the study of direct cultural transfers and entanglements between the Russian and Otto-
man empires and not a one-way interaction from the west to Russia and the Ottoman Empire. His 
view amounts to a reorientation of the research agenda whose main subjects are modernisation 
and Europeanisation away from the traditional path that leads from Europe to the two empires. 
This perspective may be indispensable, he writes, but it is not the only one capable of explaining 
the historical complexities involved, the more so if we bear in mind that both the Russian and Ot-
toman empires seem to be on the margins only from a western-centric perspective. If seen from 
a Euro-Asiatic perspective, they are at the very centre linking Europe and Asia.54 
The novel element in this approach to history is not that people, technology, ideas, perceptions, im-
ages or practices circulate across borders and, in doing so, also transform themselves. The new 
element is the emphasis in the journey towards various destinations not only from West to East – 
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thus questioning the strict line of demarcation between West and East, that Russia is only a recipi-
ent of western ideas and, finally, the issue of Russian particularism. The term influence is replaced 
by the terms adaptation and appropriation of the imported cultural goods. In addition, the historicity 
of the comparison is underlined: the comparison as a hypothesis for the historical actors-subjects. 
The comparison is seen as a research subject and not as a method. An example of such a multidi-
rectional approach is Vera Tolz’s recent work Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Orien-
tal Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), which examines 
the power–knowledge nexus via Russian oriental studies and the Russian and early Soviet science 
academies. The author looks at the differentiation between Russian and western Orientalism and 
realises that the Russian and later the Soviet orientologists of the 1880s generation (whose influ-
ence was obvious until the 1920s) engaged themselves in a criticism of European Orientalism, de-
picting it as haughty towards the East, imperialistic and racist. In studying the multitude directions 
of the movement of ideas within time and space, she brings forward a genealogical link of Said’s 
classic work Orientalism with Russian oriental studies through the Arab Marxists of the 1960s who 
were aware of the relevant entries in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia.55 
The Russian Empire and global histories
Comparative history and transnational approaches with their relational feature have contributed in 
rendering the Russian historical experience of empire part of a wider global perspective. The inter-
section of the imperial turn with global history leads to a decentring narrative as regards Europe, 
which as a result is no more regarded as the embodiment of a universal history of mankind. By 
the mid-twentieth century, Europe had already become one of the provinces of the world and the 
history of Asiatic states, as in the cases of Japan or China, implies alternative and multiple roads 
to modernity or to modernities, developments that undermine the Euro-centric constructions of 
Asia/East. As pointed out by Durba Ghosh, from within the British imperial turn and the new glo-
bal and imperial history: 
writing on globalisation the new global/imperial history presumes a de-centered narrative in 
which there was no one driving force but rather multiple and unmanageable systems, proc-
esses, imaginaries and contingent events that pushed a diversity of nations, empires and com-
munities and their subjects in different directions. The impulse behind the newest iteration of 
world history offers agency, subjectivity and history to those who participated in a global econ-
omy and ecumene and it fundamentally destabilises the longstanding binaries of subjection 
and dominance in a range of historiographies between metropole and colony, core, periphery 
and perhaps most important Europe and non Europe.56
John Darwin, in his After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405 (London: Bloomsbury, 
2007), argues that the foundations for the present globalised world are to be found in interconti-
nental networks that were established by empires, which happened to be the rule and not the ex-
ception in world history. He thus transfers the centre of gravity of the narration to Eurasia instead 
of Europe, detailing in great length the cases of Russia, Iran, China and Japan. In their monumental 
joint book Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, Russian history special-
ist Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, an historian of French colonialism in Africa, study world 
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history from the point of view of empire.57 Their avowed aim is “not to do the historiography but to 
do the history”, namely “to tell a world history” as a political history which includes a huge histori-
cal spread from the Roman Empire to the twentieth century. The method is comparative, with a 
parallel emphasis on long-term interaction. It also focuses on the transfer of models in order to 
highlight the complexity of the imperial capabilities, the repertoire of power of empires, thus re-
versing the conventional narrative that the history of the world is the historical transition from em-
pire to nation, an idea that according to their research findings does not correspond to reality. The 
authors in question use the analytical category of empire as a complex political schema based on 
difference and polymorphy, which “is very much related to the dynamics of possibility of building 
power”. They conceive nation as well empire as “ideal types” and as models of integrationist poli-
tics, one of which strives for homogenisation while the other attempts to manage diversity.58 With 
their narrative, they challenge the bipolar image of nation and empire, as well as the bipolarity of 
premodern modern empires. Their narrative does centre on the history of the nineteenth-century 
overseas empires (which are usually identified as modern empires), as most colonial studies do. 
Opting for the methodology of the comparative and transnational narrative of history of empires 
within such a wide chronological period results in diminishing the significance of modern Euro-
pean colonialism; they presume that by placing European colonialism within a wider chronologi-
cal and geographical perspective, it is possible to better understand what is more distinct about 
the nineteenth century and to explain more adequately the European hegemony within that period.
Within this wide chronological and global perspective, Russia, according to these two authors, is no 
more a “mystery”. On the contrary, if one follows the traditional European notion of normalcy then 
“you may find Russia puzzling because it is not living up to or fitting European standards. People 
pose these questions about not fitting because they have a single normative model of a polity. But 
if you look at history as a transformative process, you can see that Russia as a political organisa-
tion has had the capacity to bring in imperial traditions, merge them, and recreate them in its own 
way.”59 Moreover, the category of empire offers an inclusive model for the narration and interpre-
tation of the so-called second world, an area that colonial studies have utterly ignored with their 
concentration exclusively on the first and third worlds.60 
Burbank and Cooper’s endeavour in their Empires in World History is an attempt to reconfigure our 
relationship to the past by countering the dominant narrative of nation-states. In their place, a vari-
ety of political formations enter the picture. This approach does not limit itself to academic debate 
but aims at the diffusion of its findings towards society and, in particular, to the curriculum design 
of graduate programmes in the English-speaking world. 
Russian exceptionalism: A double-edged sword
The concept of empire and its affinities with the relational nature of comparative, transnational and 
entangled histories, as well as global history approaches, contributed in extracting the Russian his-
torical experience of empire from regional particularity and placing it within wider European and 
world perspectives.61 Thus, the interpretative example regarding the unique path of historical de-
velopment of the country (the Russian Sonderweg) was critically re-examined. The previous per-
ception presupposed a European world model that was structured on the basis of an idealised and 
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unitary Europe/West model. It is important to bear in mind that within this traditional interpretative 
scheme, the western rendition of Russian particularism finds – and continues in part to find in sci-
entific but mainly in public discourse – its symmetrical version in Russian anti-western nationalist 
discourse.62 Von Hagen has aptly pointed out that the relativity and the deconstruction of the nor-
malcy and uniqueness of Europe is in step with the deconstruction of the nonnormalcy of Russia 
and of the wider region of Eastern Europe.63 
On the other hand, the question remains what exactly does the normalisation of Russian historio-
graphy mean and with which scientific armature can this be achieved? In discussing the subject of 
Russian Orientalism, Maria Todorova focuses on the very important question of the applicability 
of the concepts of the social sciences that have been created on the basis of European/western 
experience to the Russian setting and historical experience. She believes that this creates an im-
portant epistemological problem which faces or has faced all non-western European historiogra-
phies, that is to select between the “Scylla of distinctiveness”, which leads to isolation and parochi-
alism, and the “Charybdis of generic Europeanness or universalism”, which might mean semiotic 
inequality or the cultural hegemony of the west. She suggests instead a “universalist idiom tem-
pered by a strong grounding in historical specificity”.64 The discussion on the normalisation of Rus-
sian historiography continues because, as Alexander Etkind puts it, the appropriate language has 
not been yet found to describe Russian distinctiveness, to avoid isolation and parochialism and to 
produce theory rather than simply criticising foreign theories.65 Jane Burbank says a global his-
tory perspective and long-term historical awareness is needed, and not “simply adopting prefab 
western categories”. As she argues: “We need to escape ‘we too’, history: we too have colonial-
ism, internal colonialism, centre/periphery distinctions and so on.” What is needed, she continues, 
is “the ability to see both crosscutting similarities in imperial practices and distinctive features of 
various empires (not just Russia)” and not to “simply ‘take’ the categories offered by the historiog-
raphy on other empires”.66
Conclusion
In the first post-Soviet decade, the new approaches put emphasis on nationality studies and in the 
second decade on empire studies in order to reconceptualise the historical past. Within this con-
text, the institution of empire, which in the short twentieth century was demonised and viewed as 
an archaic political category, became a historical, analytical category and a metaphor for heteroge-
neity. It is also seen as the historical antecedent of regionalism, federalism, globalism, migration 
and so on, which have transformed the concept of national sovereignty. Within this framework, it 
is proposed as a theoretical model for conceptualising a new reality. Moreover, empire is a cate-
gory of political practice and it is this dimension and its topicality that supplies the need to describe 
contemporary world hegemony, especially regarding the role of the USA in the post-bipolar world, 
where the civilisation–barbarity nexus has acquired new meaning. In particular, the discussions of 
Russia as an empire are associated to a considerable extent with the special circumstances of the 
post-Soviet world, where Russia, according to Sergei Prozonov, “faces a double problem of self 
reconstruction in the context that is both post-imperial and post-national”.67 In view of the contem-
porary Russian environment where nationalist and imperial rhetoric coexist, the question arises 
whether the imperial studies are prone to nostalgia or, worse, they promote the rehabilitation of 
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empire. Alexei Miller, in his comments about the new imperial history adopted by the editors of 
Ab Imperio, argues that in today’s Russian context what is of the essence is to distance one’s self 
from the imperial narrative, even though he regards the national narrations as inadequate in de-
scribing and analysing the historical processes of imperial formation.68 The answer to this criticism 
by the supporters of new imperial history is that rendering the concept topical with due regard to 
its historicity and theoretical aspect has not been done in order to bring it back into the real world 
of political practice but to use it as an analytical concept in the spirit of Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, as a concept which is useful for the understanding of the processes taking place in a world 
of change, in which the management of differences is a central subject.69 
The concept of empire in Russian studies highlights the fragility of the limits between the Self and 
the Other within its borders (between various groups) as well as beyond, in Europe and the world. 
However, despite the challenges and alternative historical writings, the national historical narrative 
is still potent not only within the special circumstances reigning in the post-Soviet space but also in-
ternationally. This is obvious not so much in the realm of strict scientific research but certainly in the 
manner with which school programmes are conceived, including university studies in many coun-
tries, as well as in the dominant perceptions of public history. How obvious is the teaching of glo-
bal history in various corners of the world and when taught, is it not for the most part ethno centric 
in its presentation? On the other hand the imperial turn in the study of Russian history, at least for 
those who appreciate it, continues to be a dynamic workshop for the production of new questions 
and new narratives which have transformed and continue to transform our relations with the past 
by putting a question mark on a host of traditional perceptions that dominated the scene for dec-
ades in the relevant studies as well as in our perceptions of European and world history.
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